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Third, the response of policymakers to inflation is smaller when the exchange 
rate is over-valued and larger when it is under-valued.  None of these 
responses is allowed for in the widely-used Taylor rule, suggesting that 
monetary policy is better analysed using a more sophisticated model, such as 
the one suggested in this paper. 
 
JEL:  C51; C52; E52; E58 
Keywords:  monetary policy, asset prices, nonlinearity 
 
Corresponding author: Prof Christopher Martin, Department of Economics and 
Finance, Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, UK.  
e-mail: christopher.martin@brunel.ac.uk 
 
We thank Kevin Lee and Roberto Gonzalez for useful comments and 
suggestions. 
 
 2
The Complex Response of Monetary Policy to the Exchange Rate  
 
 
1) Introduction 
 
The importance of the exchange rate to monetary policy is reflected in 
large academic and policy-related literatures on the topic.  We contribute to 
this literature by addressing three issues.  First, although empirical models of 
open-economy monetary policy rules assume that interest rates respond to 
the exchange rate, policymakers and economic commentators often focus on 
exchange rate misalignment rather than the exchange rate itself.  We 
therefore investigate whether interest rates respond to exchange rate 
misalignments rather than to the exchange rate itself.  Second, existing 
models assume that policymakers respond to all movements in the real 
exchange rate.  This may not be the case.  As a consequence of a desire to 
avoid frequent small adjustments of the interest rate and difficulties in 
measuring exchange rate misalignment with precision, policymakers may only 
respond to larger real exchange rate misalignments.  We investigate the 
evidence for this.  Third, since the exchange rate influences inflation, we 
might expect the response of policymakers to inflation to depend on the 
exchange rate.  For example, we might expect a less vigorous response to 
inflation when the exchange rate is over-valued and thus exerting downward 
pressure on inflation. We assess evidence for this. 
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 We proceed as follows.  Considering the issue of whether policymakers 
respond to exchange rates or to misalignments, the academic literature has 
tested the significance of the real exchange rate in monetary policy rules by 
estimating augmented Taylor rules which relate interest rates to inflation, the 
output gap and the exchange rate.  However contributions by policymakers 
suggest another approach.  For example, Nickell (2005), in discussing the 
appreciation of sterling that began in 1996 comments that “the dramatic rise in 
1996/7.. led people to refer to unsustainability, misalignment and even 
bubbles…  However as time passed and sterling [did not depreciate], talk of 
unsustainability and misalignment died away”. This suggests that 
policymakers may have responded to real exchange rate misalignments 
rather than the real exchange rate itself.  This implies that existing models 
may be mispecified.  We test whether policymakers respond to the real 
exchange rate itself or to exchange rate misalignments by comparing 
estimates of an augmented Taylor rule that includes the exchange rate 
against one that includes exchange rate misalignment.  
 We then consider whether the response of monetary policy to the real 
exchange rate is more sophisticated than allowed for in the simple monetary 
policy rules that have been used thus far in the literature.  These monetary 
policy rules assume a constant proportional response to the exchange rate.  
However this may be too simplistic.  As quoted in Adam et al (2005), the 
minutes of the March 1999 meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) 
state “it would not be sensible for policy to react to high frequency movements 
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in the exchange rate as this could lead to a more volatile path for interest 
rates..[which might].. make it more difficult for others to understand the 
motives for interest rate changes”.  Taken together with the difficulty in 
accurately measuring exchange rate misalignment, this suggests that 
policymakers may respond more vigorously to larger exchange rate 
misalignments.  Indeed the MPC minutes suggest that policymakers may only 
respond to large exchange rate misalignments.  
 We also consider whether the real exchange rate affects the response 
of policymakers to the inflation rate. Exchange rate misalignments affect the 
inflation rate; a large over-valuation, for example, places downward pressure 
on inflation.  One might then expect the response of policymakers to inflation 
to depend on the exchange rate, so that the response of policymakers to the 
inflation rate might be smaller when the exchange rate is substantially over-
valued. 
These latter two issues cannot be addressed using a conventional 
linear monetary policy rule, as this assumes a constant proportional response 
to inflation and the exchange rate and assumes that the marginal response to 
one variable is independent of the values of other variables.   These issues 
require a model in which the response to the exchange rate can differ 
depending on whether this is under-valued, over-valued or close to 
fundamentals.  It also requires a model in which the response to inflation 
depends on the real exchange rate.  We therefore use a multiple regime 
smooth transition model in which the behaviour of policymakers’ is allowed to 
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differ between 6 distinct regimes.  In each regime, the behaviour of 
policymakers is described by a regime-specific augmented Taylor rule.  
We address these issues using data for the UK since 1992, so our 
sample comprises the period of inflation targeting.  We have a number of 
interesting findings.  First, we find that Taylor rule models that include 
measures of real exchange rate misalignments outperform models that 
include the exchange rate.  This suggests that the latter type of model is 
mispecified and that policymakers respond to real exchange rate 
misalignment rather than the real exchange rate itself. Second, we find that 
policymakers only respond to larger misalignments of the real exchange rate.  
Our estimates suggest that there is no response to the real exchange rate if 
exchange rates are under-valued by less than 4.4% or over-valued by less 
than 5.1%.  As we discuss, these estimates imply that policymakers raised 
interest rates in response to under-valuations of the exchange rate in 1992-
1993, 1995-1996 and reduced interest rates in response to an over-valuation 
in 1996-1998, but did not respond to the exchange rate at other times.  Third, 
we find that the response of policymakers to inflation does depend on the 
exchange rate.  The response is strongest when the exchange rate is 
significantly under-valued and weakest when it is over-valued.  This implies 
that the increase in interest rates in response to excessive inflation is stronger 
in periods when exchange rate under-valuation intensifies inflationary 
pressures.   To illustrate, although inflation was excessively high in 1995-1996 
and in 1997-1998, the response to inflation was stronger in the first period 
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when the exchange was under-valued and weaker in the latter when the 
exchange rate was over-valued. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2) 
addresses the issue of whether policymakers respond to exchange rates or to 
misalignment, explaining our methodology and presenting estimates that 
suggest that the response is to misalignments.  Section 3) addresses the 
remaining issues, explaining the multiple-regime model and presenting 
estimates.  Section 4) summarises and concludes.    
 
2) Monetary policy and real exchange rate misalignment 
 
Existing empirical studies of the impact of exchange rate on monetary 
policy typically use an augmented Taylor rule, such as  
 
(1) 1 1 1 1 1 1ˆ* ( )
T f
t t t y t t f t t e t ti i E E y E i E eπρ π π ρ ρ ρ− + − + − −= + − + + +  
 
where *i  is the desired nominal interest rate, iˆ  is the equilibrium nominal 
interest rate, π  is the rate of inflation, Tπ  is the inflation target, y  is the 
output gap, fi  is the foreign interest rate and e  is the real exchange rate 
(defined as the real price of domestic currency in terms of  foreign currency). 
The specification of (1) assumes that policymakers choose the interest rate at 
the beginning of period t using information available up to the end of period (t-
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1).  The assumption that policymakers respond to the inflation rate and output 
gap expected at time (t+1) but to the foreign interest rate and exchange rate 
expected at time t reflect the timings of these variables in our preferred 
empirical specification.   Other studies do not include the real exchange rate 
(eg Adam et al, 2005) or the foreign interest rate (eg Chadha et al, 2004).  
Others, include other variables such as stock prices (e.g. Smets, 1997), 
house prices (e.g. Siklos et al, 2004) the spread between short- and long-term 
interest rates (e.g. Kristen, 2004) and money growth (e.g. Gerlach and 
Schnabel, 2000;  Clarida et al, 1998).  The relative shortness of our sample in 
the context of a multiple-regime non-linear model prevents us from including 
other variables, but hope to address this in future work. 
Allowing for interest rate smoothing (which possibly arises for the 
reasons discussed in Woodford, 2003) by assuming that the actual nominal 
interest rate adjusts towards the desired rate by 
 
(2) *1 (1 )t i t i ti i iρ ρ−= + −  
 
and invoking rational expectations, the augmented Taylor rule can be 
expressed as  
 
(3) 1 1 1ˆ(1 ){ ( ) }
T f
t i t i t y t f t e t ti i i y i eπρ ρ ρ π π ρ ρ ρ ε− + += + − + − + + + +  
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where ε  is an error term that contains the errors generated by replacing 
expected values of variables with actual values. 
Estimates of this model are presented in column (i) of Table 1.  We use 
UK data for the period 1992Q4-2005Q4.  We measure i using the 3-month 
Treasury Bill Rate, π as the year-on-year proportional change in the retail 
price index, y as the proportional deviation of output from its underlying 
(Hodrick-Prescott, 1997) trend, if is the US 3-month effective funds rate and e 
is the log of the real effective exchange rate.  These definitions are similar to 
the existing literature, although Adam et al (2005) use both US and German 
interest rates (we also present estimates that use this rate), while Chadha et 
al (2004) measure the output gap using the share of labour in national income  
(Gali et al, 2001).  Since 1997Q2 (when the Bank of England was given 
operational independence), the inflation target, Tπ , is equal to 2.5 percent.  
Prior to that date, we construct the target as the centred two-year moving 
average of actual inflation (see also the discussion in Kesriyeli et al, 2006).  
Figure 1 plots the UK interest rate, UK inflation rate, UK output gap, the US 
interest rate and the German (Euro after 1999) interest rate.  
 We estimate that πρ =1.82, which is similar to other estimates,  
yρ =1.31, which is somewhat higher than in other studies, fρ =0.42, which is 
again similar to other studies (Adam et al, 2005, Table 1) summarises 
estimates of this parameter in other papers)  and  eρ =0.17, this latter being 
insignificant (Chadha et al, 2004 report a significant estimate of 0.06).   There 
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is evidence of a structural break in the estimated relationship in 1997Q2 
following the transfer of responsibility for interest rate decisions to the newly-
formed monetary policy committee.  This is consistent with the results in 
Adam et al (2005), who estimate different policy rules for the periods 1992-
1997 and 1997-2003. 
 We next consider exchange rate misalignment.  To do this, we 
estimate the model 
 
(4) 1 1 1ˆ(1 ){ ( ) ( * )}
T f
t i t i t y t f t e t t ti i i y i e eπρ ρ ρ π π ρ ρ ρ ε− + += + − + − + + + − +  
 
where *e  is the equilibrium real exchange rate and so *e e−  is real 
exchange rate misalignment.   We calculate the equilibrium real exchange 
rate as the Hodrick-Prescott filtered value (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) of the 
real exchange rate and calculate exchange rate misalignment as the 
difference between the real exchange rate and its trend value.  The resultant 
series is plotted in Figure 2, alongside the exchange rate.  The narrative in 
Cobham (2006) provides a detailed description of movements in the 
exchange rate over this period and the concerns of policymakers about this, 
while Batini and Nelson (2005) provide a broader historical perspective.  The 
exchange rate was under-valued between 1993-1996, over-valued from 1996-
2000 and close to equilibrium thereafter.  The effects of the appreciation that 
began in 1996 are initially marked but fall away quite rapidly.  This is 
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consistent with the comments of Nickell (2005) cited above.  Although a more 
satisfactory measure of real exchange rate misalignment might be derived 
from a more structural model, we would argue that the measure depicted in 
Figure 2 is plausible and will serve as a satisfactory first approximation.  
Column (ii) of Table 1 reports estimates of (4).  The estimates of πρ  and yρ  
are lower and more consistent with earlier studies, the estimate of fρ  is little 
changed, while eρ =0.096 and is now significant.  Equation (4) has a lower 
standard error than (3).  There is also no evidence of a break in the 
relationship in 1997, in contrast to (3). Columns (iii) and (iv) present estimates 
of (3) and (4) respectively using the German (Euro) rather than the US 
interest rate.  The conclusions are similar, although these models fit the data 
less well than the corresponding estimates in columns (i) and (ii); column (iv) 
has a lower standard error than (iii) and, in contrast to (iii), has a significant 
exchange rate effect.  The evidence in Table 1 suggests that policymakers 
may indeed respond to exchange rate misalignment rather than the exchange 
rate itself. 
 
3)  A more complex model 
 
In this section we turn to the issues of whether policymakers only 
respond to larger exchange misalignments and whether the response to 
inflation depends on the exchange rate.  Neither issue can be addressed 
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using an augmented Taylor rule like (4).  In that, interest rates respond to all 
exchange misalignments irrespective of their size, while the marginal 
response of interest rates to inflation is always πρ  and so is not affected by 
the exchange rate. 
 We might address these issues using a three regime model in which 
policymakers followed a different Taylor-like linear policy rule depending on 
whether the exchange rate was over-valued, under-valued or close to 
fundamentals.  We could conclude that policymakers only respond to larger 
misalignment if there was no response to the exchange rate in the “inner” 
regime where misalignment was low.  Also, the response to inflation would 
depend on the exchange rate if this response differed between regimes.  
However this model may be too simple because there is also evidence that 
the behaviour of policymakers differs according to whether or not inflation is 
close to the inflation target (Martin and Milas, 2004).  
We therefore use the following six-regime model 
 
(5)  1 1 2 3
4 5 6
ˆ(1 )[ { (1 ) }
(1 ){ (1 ) }]
f f eO eU eO eU
t t t t t t t t t t t
eO eU eO eU
t t t t t t t t t
i i i i M M M
M M M
π
π
ρ ρ ρ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ ε
−= + − + + + + − −
+ − + + − − +  
 
where *1 1 2 1 3( ) ( )
T
jt j t j t j tM y e eρ π π ρ ρ+ += − + + −  for j=1,..,6; tπθ  is the 
probability, at the beginning of period t, that inflation in period t+1 will be in the 
inner inflation regime, where inflation is close to the inflation target, eOtθ  is the 
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probability that the real exchange rate in period t will be over-valued, while 
eU
tθ  is the probability it will be under-valued. In this model, the response of 
interest rates to the lagged and foreign interest rates is the same as in (4)1.   
But the response to inflation, output and the exchange rate is allowed to differ 
between regimes depending on the exchange rate and the inflation rate.   1tM  
is a linear function that represents the behaviour of policymakers when 
inflation is expected to be close to target but the exchange rate is expected to 
be over-valued.   In effect 1tM  is an augmented Taylor rule specific to this 
regime.  2tM  and 3tM  are augmented Taylor rules that describe the behaviour 
of policymakers in the regimes where inflation is expected to be close to 
target and the exchange rate is expected to be either under-valued or close to 
fundamentals respectively. Similarly, 4tM , 5tM  and 6tM  describe the 
behaviour of policymakers when inflation is not expected to be close to target 
and the exchange rate is expected to be over-valued, under-valued or close to 
fundamentals respectively. If 1 2 3n n nρ ρ ρ= =  and 4 5 6n n nρ ρ ρ= =  for each of 
1,2,3n = , then the behaviour of policymakers does not differ between 
exchange rate regimes and so the model can be simplified to one with two 
regimes for the inflation rate.  If 1 4n nρ ρ= , 2 5n nρ ρ=  and 3 6n nρ ρ= for each of 
1,2,3n = , then the behaviour of policymakers does not differ between inflation 
regimes and the model can be simplified to one with three exchange rate 
                                                          
1  Preliminary estimates of more general models revealed that neither the response to the 
foreign interest rate nor the interest rate persistence differs between regimes.    
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regimes. If 1 2 3 4 5 6n n n n n nρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ= = = = =  for each of 1,2,3n = , the model 
simplifies to the Taylor rule in (4). 
This model can be used to address the issues we are concerned with.  
If 33 0ρ =  and 63 0ρ = , then interest rates do not respond to the exchange rate 
when misalignments are small.   If 11ρ  differs from 21ρ  and 31ρ  and 41ρ  differ 
from 51ρ  and 61ρ , then the response to inflation depends on the exchange 
rate misalignment; there is a larger response when the exchange rate is 
under-valued if 21ρ  is larger than both 11ρ  and 31ρ , and 51ρ  is larger than both 
41ρ  and 61ρ . 
We make the model operational by assuming  
 
(6) 2
1 1 1 1 ( 1 )1
( )( ) /1
1
Pr{ ( ) } 1
1
T L T U
t t t t T
tt
L U
t
T
t
e π π
π
π
γ π π τ π π τ σθ τ π π τ + + + + ++ −− − − −+ −= ≤ ≤ = − +
−  
(7) *
*( )
*
( ) /
1
Pr{( ) } 1
1
O
t t
eO
e et t
eO O
t t t e e
e e
e
γ φ σθ φ −− − −= − < = − +
 
(8) *
*( )
*
( ) /
1
Pr{ ( )}
1
U
t t
eU
e et t
eU U
t t t e e
e e
e
γ φ σθ φ −− − −< − = +
=  
Equation (6) defines the inner inflation regime as the probability that 
inflation is no less than Lτ  percentage points below the target or no more than 
Uτ  percentage points above, where we note that these regime boundaries 
may be asymmetric.  The probability is modelled using a quadratic logistic 
function (Jansen and Teräsvirta, 1996).  Equations (7) and (8) state that the 
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economy is in the over-valued (resp. under-valued) exchange rate regime if 
the exchange rate is over-valued by more than Oφ  percentage points (resp. 
under-valued by more than Uφ percentage points).  These regime boundaries 
may also be asymmetric.  The smoothness parameters πγ , eOγ  and eUγ > 0 
determine the smoothness of the transition regimes.  We follow Granger and 
Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994) in making πγ  dimension-free by 
dividing it by the variance of 1 1t
T
tπ π+ +−  and making eOγ  and eUγ  dimension-
free by dividing them by the standard deviation of *t te e− . 
 Clearly, estimating such a complex model on a relatively limited span 
of data is challenging.  Fortunately, we were able to impose a series of 
restrictions that simplified estimation greatly.  These were (i) interest rates 
only respond to output in the inner inflation and exchange rate regimes (this 
implies  12 22 42 52 62 0ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ= = = = = ); (ii) there is no response to inflation in 
the inner inflation regime (this implies 11 21 31 0ρ ρ ρ= = = ); (iii) there is no 
response to the exchange rate in the inner exchange rate regime (this implies 
33 63 0ρ ρ= = ); (iv) the response of interest rates to the real exchange rate is 
independent of the rate of inflation (this implies 13 23ρ ρ=  and 43 53ρ ρ= ). 
 Estimates of the resulting model are presented in column (i) of Table 2.  
The standard error is substantially lower than for the Taylor rule models 
reported in Table 1, so this approach gives a much better fit to the data.  We 
estimate the regime boundaries to be –0.522 and 0.261 for the inflation 
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regime and –5.11 and 4.37 for the exchange rate regimes.  These imply that 
the economy is in the inner inflation regime when inflation is expected to fall 
between 1t
Tπ + -0.522 and 1tTπ + +0.261 percent.  Since the inflation target was 
2.5% from 1997Q2 onwards, the upper boundary of 2.761% to the inner 
inflation regime is closer to the inflation target than the lower boundary of 
1.978%.  This implies a deflationary bias to monetary policy, confirming the 
findings of Martin and Milas (2004).  The estimated boundaries to the 
exchange rate regimes imply that the economy is in the over-valued (resp. 
under-valued) exchange rate regime when the real exchange rate is over-
valued by more than 5.11% (resp under-valued by more than 4.37%). Both 
inflation and exchange rate boundaries are asymmetric based on the 
statistical tests reported at the bottom of Table 2. 2   
There is no response of interest rates to the real exchange rate in the 
inner exchange rate regime.  We therefore conclude that policymakers do not 
respond to the real exchange rate when this is over-valued by less than 
5.11% or under-valued by less than 4.37%.  We also find that the response to 
inflation does depend on the exchange rate.  Interest rates do not respond to 
the inflation rate in the inner inflation regime, when inflation is expected to be 
                                                          
2 The smoothness parameters πγ , eOγ  and eUγ  reported in Table 2, are imprecisely 
estimated.  Teräsvirta (1994) and van Dijk et al (2002) point out that this should not be 
interpreted as evidence against the model’s validity. Accurate estimation of πγ , eOγ  and eUγ  
is problematic because it requires many observations in the immediate neighbourhood of the 
regime boundaries. Furthermore, large changes in the smoothness parameters have a small 
impact on the shape of the functions (6), (7) and (8), which implies that estimates of πγ , eOγ  
and eUγ  do not have to be precise (van Dijk et al, 2002). 
 16
between the 1t
Tπ + -0.522 and 1tTπ + +0.261 percent boundaries (between 
1.978% and 2.761% from 1997Q2 onwards).  In the outer inflation regime, the 
response to inflation is stronger when the exchange rate is in the under-
valued exchange rate regime (i.e. 51ρ = 3.047) and weaker in the over-valued 
exchange rate regime (i.e. 41ρ =1.269).   
Column (ii) of Table 2 reports estimates of the same model but where 
the German (Euro) is used in place of the the US interest rate.  These 
estimates lead to similar conclusions.  In this model, policymakers do not 
respond to the real exchange rate when this is over-valued by less than 
5.86% or under-valued by less than 4.96%.   Policymakers do not respond to 
the inflation rate in the inner inflation regime, when inflation is expected to be 
between 1t
Tπ + -0.66 and 1tTπ + +0.194 percent (between 1.84% and 2.694% 
from 1997Q2 onwards).  The response of interest rates to inflation is again 
stronger when the real exchange rate is under-valued. 
The implications of these estimates for the interpretation of recent UK 
monetary policy are explored in figures 3 and 4.  Figure 3) depicts real 
exchange rate misalignment and the estimated boundaries. Our estimates 
suggest that policymakers raised interest rates in response to under-
valuations of the exchange rate in 1992-1993, 1995-1996 and reduced 
interest rates in response to an over-valuation in 1996-1998, but did not 
respond to the exchange rate at other times.   Policymakers did not respond 
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to the exchange rate between 1998-2005 as real exchange rate misalignment 
remained within the regime boundaries.  By contrast, a Taylor rule model 
would imply frequent small interest rate adjustments in this period.  Figure 4) 
depicts the respond of interest rates to inflation implied by the estimates of 
column (I) of table 2), calculated as: 
 
(9) 41 51 61(1 ){ (1 ) }
eO eU eO eU
t t t t t t
π
πρ θ θ ρ θ ρ θ θ ρ= − + + − −  
 
To illustrate, although inflation was excessively high in 1995-1996 and in 
1997-1998, the response to inflation was stronger in the first period when the 
exchange was under-valued and weaker in the latter when the exchange rate 
was over-valued.  
 
4)  Conclusions 
This paper has estimated a flexible non-linear monetary policy rule for the UK 
to examine the response of policymakers to the real exchange rate.  Three 
main findings emerge.  First, policymakers respond to real exchange rate 
misalignments rather than to the exchange rate itself.  Second, policymakers 
ignore small deviations of the exchange rate; they only respond to real 
exchange under-valuations of more than 4% and over-valuations of more than 
5%.  Third, the response of policymakers to inflation depends on the 
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exchange rate.  The response to inflation is smaller when the exchange rate is 
over-valued and larger when it is under-valued.   
Our work can be extended in several ways. We might estimate our 
model using data for different countries in order to investigate the impact of 
the exchange rate on monetary policy and assess whether the response of 
monetary policy to inflation depends on the exchange rate.  We might also 
develop a more structural model of the exchange rate and examine its effect 
on the monetary policy rule. We intend to address these issues in future work. 
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Table 1: Estimates of Augmented Taylor rules (1992Q4 2005Q4) 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
 Model with 
US interest 
rate and 
exchange rate 
regressors 
Model with 
US interest 
rate and 
exchange rate 
misalignment 
regressors 
Model with 
German 
(Euro) interest 
rate and 
exchange rate 
regressors 
Model with 
German 
(Euro) interest 
rate and 
exchange rate 
misalignment 
regressors 
iˆ    1.044 (0.473)  0.691 (0.041)  0.545 (0.273)  0.487 (0.103) ρ   0.776 (0.315)  0.820 (0.010)  0.872 (0.041)  0.844 (0.027) 
πρ   1.820 (0.320)  1.762 (0.126)  1.713 (0.539)  1.839 (0.538) 
yρ   1.311 (0.336)  0.911 (0.140)  1.662 (0.872)  1.090 (0.488) 
fρ   0.417 (0.047)  0.380 (0.021)  0.193 (0.007)  0.311 (0.076) 
eρ  
 
 0.168 (0.112) 
 
 0.096 (0.007)  0.103 (0.074)  0.056 (0.020) 
2
R     0.89   0.90    0.87    0.88  
Standard error    0.340   0.320    0.371    0.351 
Inst. validity    [0.98]   [0.98]   [0.99]   [0.93] 
Normality   [0.73]   [0.61]   [0.91]   [0.67] 
Break-mpc   [0.01]   [0.12]   [0.06]   [0.07] 
Notes:  
(a) Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimates. Numbers in square 
brackets are the probability values of the test statistics. Inst.validity is the p-value of J 
test of the exogeneity of the instruments, normality is the is the p-value of the  Jarque-
Bera test for normality of the estimate residuals, while break-mpc is the p-value of a 
Chow test for a structural break in 1997Q2 following the formation of the Monetary Policy 
committee.  
(b) A constant and up to 6 lags of all variables are used as instruments for the estimates.   
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Table 2: Estimates of 6-regime monetary policy rules (1992Q4 2005Q4) 
 
Variable/regime 
 
 
(i) 
Model with US 
interest rate 
regressor 
(ii) 
Model with German 
(Euro) interest rate  
regressor 
iˆ   Constant   1.285 (0.054)   0.796 (0.024)ρ  Lagged interest rate   0.633 (0.016)   0.717 (0.010)
fρ  Foreign interest rate   0.411 (0.010)   0.271 (0.020)
1M  Inner Inflation, Exchange rate Over-valued 
13ρ   Exchange rate  0.075 (0.011)   0.147 (0.017)
2M  Inner Inflation, Exchange rate Under-valued 
23ρ  Exchange rate   0.075 (0.011)   0.147 (0.017)
3M  Inner Inflation, Inner Exchange rate 
32ρ  Output gap   0.896 (0.205)   1.141 (0.433)
4M  Outer Inflation, Exchange rate Over-valued 
41ρ   Inflation  1.269 (0.087)   1.569 (0.037)
43ρ   Exchange rate  0.027 (0.009)   0.067 (0.007)
5M  Outer Inflation, Exchange rate Under-valued 
51ρ   Inflation  3.047 (0.390)   2.167 (0.868)
53ρ  Exchange rate   0.027 (0.009)   0.067 (0.007)
6M  Outer Inflation, Inner Exchange rate 
61ρ   
 
 
Inflation 
 
 
 1.468 (0.062)   1.233 (0.045)
Lτ            -0.522 (0.038)  -0.660 (0.048)
Uτ             0.261 (0.071)    0.194 (0.010)
Oφ           -5.112 (0.107)   -5.863 (1.874)
Uφ           4.368 (0.248)    4.962 (1.001)
πγ      5.525 (19.086)  22.981 (48.105)
eOγ     20.005 (79.543)    89.598 (579.543)
eUγ    10.876 (132.043)   332.755 (330.040)
2
R    0.934   0.900
Standard error   0.262   0.319
Inst. Validity    [0.98]   [0.98]
Normality   [0.14]   [0.63]
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0 13 23:H ρ ρ=  a   [0.17]   [0.32]
0 43 53:H ρ ρ=  b   [0.10]   [0.07]
0 41 51 61:H ρ ρ ρ= = c   [0.00]   [0.00]
0 :
L UH τ τ= −  d    [0.00]   [0.00]
0 :
O UH φ φ=−  e   [0.00]    [0.00]
Notes: See the notes of Table 1. 
a Test of common output effects.  
b Test of common exchange rate effects.  
c Test of common inflation effects. 
d Test of symmetric inflation bounds. 
e Test of symmetric exchange rate bounds. 
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Figure 1: Plots of TBR, inflation, output gap, US interest rate and EU 
interest rate 
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(c) Output gap    (d) US interest rate 
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(e)  EU interest rate 
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Figure 2: Plot of the real exchange rate and the real exchange rate gap 
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Note: LHS axis: measurement units of the real exchange rate (RER). RHS axis: 
measurement units of the real exchange rate gap (RER gap).   
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Figure 3: The real exchange rate gap and estimated boundaries 
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Note: The lower bound equals –5.11% and the upper bound equals 4.37%. 
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Figure 4: The response of interest rates to inflation 
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Note: LHS axis: measurement units of the inflation impact (p_impact) calculated as: 
41 51 61(1 ){ (1 ) }
eO eU eO eU
t t t t t t
π
πρ θ θ ρ θ ρ θ θ ρ= − + + − −  based on the estimates reported in column 
(i) of Table 2. RHS axis: measurement units of the UK Treasury Bill rate (TBR) in %. 
 
 
